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How did human consciousness arise, in
comparison with that of apes? This ques-
tion has motivated many hypotheses, from
psychoanalysis (Freud, 1939) and litera-
ture (Bloom, 1999) to evolutionary psy-
chology (Dennett, 1997; Tomasello, 2014).
One of the most provocative is that of
Julian Jaynes (1976), who understood the
question as pertaining to the cultural evo-
lution of introspection during the firstmil-
lennium BC, known as Axial Age (Jaspers,
1953). Based on ancient texts, Jaynes pos-
tulated that our current awareness began
with memories of commands uttered by
clan chiefs, which allowed for sustained
work throughout the day even in the
chief ’s absence. When chiefs died the
memories of their voices reverberated in
the remaining subjects, and this occurred
more strongly in dreams than in waking,
due to the absence of sensory interfer-
ence. Humans evolved a bicameral mind
in which part of the activity dealt with
the present to perform actions, while the
other part dealt with past and future to
produce auditory hallucinations perceived
as external commands.
Over millennia, people with such men-
tal organization left the caves to build
cities and pyramids, as societies with hun-
dreds of thousands members led by a
few who heard the voices of dead ances-
tors turned gods. Eventually there were
too many mouths to feed, the empires
collapsed, and the voices became mute.
Texts spanning several centuries before
1000 BC reflect this divine silence, as
the mental separation between gods and
people gradually dissolved. The bicameral
person who heard voices gave place to
the unicameral individual in whom the
self-representation uses its vast mnemonic
repertoire not to hallucinate, but to
imagine plans. For contemporary men-
tality the incessant voices of our inter-
nal dialog are ours only, not from
other entities. Those who today are still
split in mental compartments would be
psychotic.
For many years this shrewd hypothe-
sis seemed untestable. Corollaries such as
the right lateralization of auditory halluci-
nations were dismissed as too simplistic—
although schizophrenic patients present
less language lateralization (Sommer et al.,
2001). Yet, the investigation by Diuk et al.
(2012) represents a pioneering success-
ful attempt to test Jaynes’ theory in a
quantitative manner. The authors assessed
dozens of Judeo-Christian and Greco-
Roman texts from up to the second cen-
tury CE, as well contemporary Google
n-grams, to calculate semantic distances
between the reference word “introspec-
tion” and all the words in these texts.
Cleverly, “introspection” is actually absent
from these ancient texts, serving as an
“invisible” probe. Semantic distances were
evaluated by Latent Semantic Analysis,
a high-dimensional model in which the
semantic similitude between words is pro-
portional to their co-occurrence in texts
with coherent topics (Deerwester et al.,
1990; Landauer and Dumais, 1997). The
approach goes well beyond the mere
counting of word occurrence in a cor-
pus, actually measuring how much the
concept of introspection is represented
in each text in a “distributed semantic
sense,” in accordance with the seman-
tic holism (Frege, 1884, 1980; Quine,
1951; Wittgenstein, 1953, 1967; Davidson,
1967) that became mainstream in artifi-
cial intelligence (AI) and machine learn-
ing (Cancho and Sole, 2001; Sigman and
Cecchi, 2002).
The results were remarkable. In
Judeo-Christian texts, similitude to
introspection increased monotonically
over time, with a big change in slope
from the Old to the New Testaments.
In Greco-Roman texts, comprising 53
authors from Homer to Julius Cesar,
a more complex dynamics appeared,
with increases in similitude to intro-
spection through periods of cultural
development, and decreases during peri-
ods of cultural decadence. Contemporary
texts showed overall increase, with peri-
ods of decline prior to and during the
two World Wars. As Jaynes would have
predicted, the rise and fall of entire
societies seems to be paralleled by
increases and decreases in introspection,
respectively.
Diuk et al. show that the evolution
of mental life can be quantified from
the cultural record, opening a whole new
avenue of hypothesis testing for Jaynes’
theory. While it is impossible to prove
that pre-Axial people “heard” the voices
of the gods, the findings suggest new ways
of studying historical and contemporary
texts. In particular, the probing of ancient
texts with words like “dream,” “god” and
“hallucination” has great potential to test
Jaynesian concepts.
The featured study lends supports
to the notion that consciousness is a
social construct in constant flux. Quoting
senior author Guillermo Cecchi, “it is
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not just the “trending topics,” but the
entire cognitive make-up that changes
over time, indicating that culture co-
evolves with available cognitive states, and
what is socially considered dysfunction
can be tested in a more quantitative way.”
Indeed, computer science tools are now
being applied to psychology and psychia-
try (Gottschalk and Bechtel, 2005; Strous
et al., 2009; Cabana et al., 2011; Cohen and
Elvevåg, 2014; Valle-Lisboa et al., 2014).
Graph-theoretical analysis of speech from
psychotic patients leads to accurate dif-
ferential diagnosis of schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder type I (Mota et al., 2012,
2014). Semantic analysis is likely to yield
even better classification of psychopatho-
logical speech symptoms, as indicated
by the successful discrimination of men-
tal states induced by psychoactive drugs
(Bedi et al., 2014).
The quantification of behavior and
the availability of big data create new
opportunities in neuroscience research.
For instance, there are now many more
tools to study the interplay between lan-
guage, literacy, introspection and lateral-
ization. The featured study opens espe-
cially useful paths for the recent boom in
the decoding of neural activity, through
which abstract concepts can be directly
measured (Kay et al., 2008; Mitchell
et al., 2008; Horikawa et al., 2013).
Cortical semantic representations were
recently found to be warped by atten-
tion in a holistic manner (Çukur et al.,
2013).
More speculatively, the featured study
suggests a more intimate relationship
between AI and neuroscience, i.e., AI as
a tool used to understand the brain and
the mind, and not just to mimic the
mind. Given the brain’s complexity, this
may be the only way forward. Without
an objective way to model and quantify
meaning, no deep understanding of the
mind will be possible. A bold step in
this direction is precisely what the dis-
coveries by Diuk, Slezak and collaborators
contribute.
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